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The study has evaluated which are the most relevant factors that determine that a 
small farmer switch marketing channels in order to enter into a "dynamic" 
market; that is, into a market signed by more complex contractual relationships 
that can absorb increasing amounts of its output. The results show that there are a 
number of producers that currently are not selling to those markets but they may 
well do so. Restrictions associated to the degree of organization of the producers, 
their perception of risk and credit market restrictions may prevent these farmers 
to gain access to the additional benefits that these new market opportunities have 
to offer. 
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Supply chain management in the domestic markets of developing countries is a 
significant recent institutional change affecting smallholder agriculture. For poor farmers, 
the benefit of new supply chain management is that it can provide information on new 
products, input, credit and extension services, and marketing services. These can ease the 
resource constraint that farmers face otherwise, and reduce production and marketing 
risks for farmers, helping them engage into more complex contract arrangements 
typically associated with “dynamic markets”. For purpose of this study “dynamic market” 
refers to those markets able to absorb increasing levels of farm output due to its size or its 
rapidly increasing demand.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to understand which may be the critical factors that 
determine that small farmers enter these institutional arrangements. We analyze a 
stratified sample of over 300 small potato farmers (less than 5 hectares) living in the 
Mantaro Valley in the central highlands of Peru. Around 100 of these farmers have 
adopted key farming and/or marketing innovations that allow them to enter into two more 
dynamic markets: (a) producing high quality seeds or (b) producing high quality potatoes 
for the chips industry. The rest of the sample covers relatively similar producers (same 
ecological setting, similar land holding) which have opt to sell their potato through 
traditional marketing channels and can be used as a control group to evaluate the impact 
and determinants of accessing dynamic markets.  
 
2. New Marketing Channels for small commercial Potato Farmers Peru. 
 
Potato is a product of high importance in the Peruvian food system.  It is harvested in 
almost every region of the country, although its production is concentrated in the Andean 
region, given the lower temperatures of this region favor the growth of the crop. The 
production of potato is basically oriented to domestic consumption. 
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According to the 1994 Peruvian Agriculture Census, there were around 800.000 potato 
producers in the entire country, of which near 60% worked on agricultural plots smaller 
than 5 hectares. The most important zones of production are located on the central Andes, 
in the Mantaro Valley. The data used in this paper includes potato producers along this 
valley. Within this valley, traditional areas mainly associated with self-consumption 
coexist with areas with strong linkages to the market.  The purpose of this study was 
shaped on the comparison between small potato farmers that have been articulated to 
dynamic markets from their experience with technical assistance, and those that have not 
made that transition and remain articulated with traditional marketing channels. In the 
Mantaro Valley we can encounter two different ways used by potato producers to 
articulate themselves to dynamic markets: (a) a group of producers that are linked to the 
dynamic markets through the production and sales of certified potato seeds; and (b) a 
group of producers linked through the production and sales of potato of industrial quality 
to be used on the chips industry.  
 
Two companies that provided the technical assistance necessary to develop the 
articulation with dynamic markets were identified. One of the companies is called 
FOVIDA and the other is ECOSER These technical assistance companies have been 
working on the central Andes of Peru in the context of a technical assistance fund 
(INCAGRO) launch by the government of Peru to develop a private market for these 
services. FOVIDA is an NGO that has been working in the Mantaro Valley since 1997; it 
has commercial links with Snacks America Latina Peru SRL (Frito Lay, main producer of 
potato chips in Peruvian market). Since 1998 FOVIDA has become one of the major 
suppliers of a specific potato variety (diacol  capiro) that complies with the quality 
standards needed for the production of potato chips. As it is indicated in FOVIDA (2002), 
the NGO provides technical assistance around three areas: organization skills, techno-
agro ecologic capabilities, and management and marketing skills.  ECOSER on the other 
hand is an NGO devoted to the improvement of potato seed varieties. As mentioned in 
ECOSER Jauja (2001), the assistance services provided are based on an efficient process 
of obtaining in vitro “seedlings”, pre basic seeds from the company greenhouse, and 
finally getting seeds to farmers. ECOSER activities include extension and capacity   5
building activities including quality control, certification, prevention of plagues and 
diseases thru an integrated management strategy, post-harvest and in-store management 
techniques. ECOSER also provides technical assistance to improve organizational 
capabilities of producers. 
The Relationship between Small Farming and the Potato Processing Agro industry 
 
In 1998 the processing firm, Snacks America Latina Peru SRL reduced from 30 to 7 the 
number of farmers they had contracts with. However this was done at a high storage cost. 
Because of the characteristics of the Peruvian potato farm system, in order to have all 
year round supply of potato, the industry needs to combine potato coming from the 
southern Costa (from December to March), the Sierra (from end of March till July), and 
the central Costa region (from August to November).  
 
However, consolidated land holdings with the scale needed for the industry are only 
secured in the Costa region. Thus, a reduced number of potato growers imply the need for 
buying potato and storing it throughout the period when there is not available harvest in 
the Costa.  Under this condition, there was a “window of opportunity” for an 
intermediary that can bear the monitoring cost associated with coordinating small potato 
farmers in the sierra region. If the monitor costs were lower than the storage costs, such a 
contracting scheme is possible. This is how FOVIDA, an NGO that worked with potato 
farmers in both the Costa and Sierra regions, found itself with the opportunity of filling 
this gap. In turn, the need for proper seeds opened the opportunity for ECOSER. 
 
The contract that is subscribed between the industry and the individual farmers, or with 
FOVIDA in the case of small producers, is essentially the same. The contract is signed 
two or three months prior two the sowing season. The contract establishes a fixed price 
that is always substantially above the price of potato going to the traditional channel. 
However, the contract establishes specific objectives in terms of increasing yields 
production costs, proper management of the crop, etc.  The industry has very strict 
quality standards that farmers must comply. For example, the dry content of the potato   6
should be in the 22%-to 24% range to be accepted. Sugar content should be in the 0.02% 
to 0.03% range for proper frying.  FOVIDA does this monitoring work for the firm.  
 
The role of FOVIDA as a successful intermediary between the firm and small producers 
is evident in a number of activities performed by the NGO, which can be summarized 
under three headings: a) usage of Information networks; b) building trust; and c) building 
capacity for collective action (Johnson et al. 2002). First, FOVIDA has been able to use 
its network of potato producers in the Costa Region (that was built prior to its work in the 
Sierra region) to identify seed suppliers of the variety Capiro for the Sierra (ECOSER). In 
addition, it has taken advantage of its knowledge of the input and output markets to 
benefit small farms through the reduction of key transactions costs. It has also provided 
technical advice. Second, FOVIDA has been able to build “social capital” in the form of 
trust. This has occurred, first, by reducing Frito Lay’s cost of monitoring contract 
compliance and by managing emergencies that occur along the cropping season. Quick 
response to the latter affects positively the quality of the potato that reaches the 
processing plant. The ability of the firm to verify that quality always meets required 
standard has allowed for trust to emerge and consolidate. In turn, this increasing trust has 
affected the marketing behavior of the firm increasing the share of the market that is 
supplied by FOVIDA, strengthening the bonds between firm and the intermediary. 
Finally, FOVIDA has organized small farmers to take advantage of their collective action 
and has obtained economies of scale in the input and output markets.  In particular, 
collective marketing, collective provision of inputs, financing, and purchase of 
complementary services like technical assistance are key elements that render tangible 
benefits in terms of lower input costs and higher output margins, when negotiating with 
the industry.   
3. The Data 
 
As both of the NGO’s worked under a technical assistance program that co-financed 
around 50% of the provision of the service, it was possible to access the register book and 
therefore identify the producers that were having access to this support mechanism. In 
addition, from a list of farmers provided by both companies, producers that had received   7
assistance for a year or less were excluded from the sample.  The latter allowed to ensure 
that those farmers that were sampled as “connected to dynamic markets”  had effectively 
enough time to incorporate the practices taught through the technical assistance 
programs.  
 
The study focuses on a sample of about 289 potato producers. The sample is quite 
heterogeneous, comprising a wide diversity of production scales and market insertion 
mechanisms so as to generate an in-depth assessment of the restrictions as well as 
potentialities that dynamic markets exhibit in the context of small farm producers. The 
sample design is such that it comprises 89 small producers that have accessed some 
market niche (considered as dynamic markets) through technical assistance, compared to 
206 producers that have not requested technical assistance and keep selling their output to 
traditional markets. For the crop under analysis (i.e. potato), market niches that can be 




As it can be seen on the Table 1, the potato producers that have access to dynamic 
markets have a higher educational level (an average of almost 2 more years of formal 
schooling for the head of the family, and more than 2 on the number of years of schooling 
of the most educated family member), better life conditions (associated to the 
characteristics of dwelling), and more household assets (almost three times more 
productive assets, and almost two times the size of the land property) than farmers still on 
traditional markets. Additionally, farmers with access to dynamic markets participate in 
more organizational activities. Farmers related to dynamic markets also have the 
perception that access and levels of credit they could have are significantly higher than 
those available to farmers with no access to this markets.  Finally, the results also show 
that these farmers are willing to take bigger risks. 
 
                                                 
4 Given the sample design, there are no producers that have access to dynamic markets without any 
technical assistance. As a result of this, the analysis can not distinguish between the pure effects of the 
technical assistance from the impact that the technical assistance generates by allowing farmers’ access to 
new market opportunities. This being the case, the results of this research must be read as the joint impact 
of both processes.   8
Table 1 
Characteristics of the Potato Producers 
 
Variable Description Dynamic Mkts. Traditional Mkts.
Number of Household Members 4.5 4.9
Sex of Head of Household 0.93 0.94
Age of Head of Household 48.3 48.6
Years of Education of Head of Household 11.7 9.9***
Maximum Years of Education within the Household 13.5 12.1***
Dwelling has a Quatity Roof (yes=1) 0.19 0.09**
Appropriate Access to  Water on dwelling (yes=1) 0.9 0.70***
Dwelling has a Quatity floor (yes=1) 0.64 0.39***
Dwelling has a Quatity walls (yes=1) 0.31 0.17***
Appropriate Access to toilet services on dwelling (yes=1) 0.34 0.25*
Appropriate Access to power supply on dwelling (yes=1) 0.96 0.94
Household Assets Value 3,100 2,105**
Productive Assets Value 14,117 5,179***
Land Holding (Has.) 5.7 2.3***
Risk Attitude - (1=more averse, 5=less averse) 32 . 5 * *
Maximum Credit access 20,859 7,476***
Number of Organization Memberships 2.2 1.2***
Note:***99% significance, ** 95% significance, * 90% significance.
 
 
The differences between the farmers with access to dynamic markets through specialized 
technical assistance, and those without access to any technical assistance and still relying 
on traditional consumption market evidence that ECOSER and FOVIDA have 
accomplished to enroll in their program a group of farmers that could be called an “elite”. 
 
4.  Estimation of the “distance” to dynamic markets. 
4.1. Methodological Framework 
 
Following Lapar et al (2003), a way of studying the decision of the farmers on the matter 
of accessing or not dynamic markets, is the comparison between the utility that the 
farmer would receive if he would have access to those markets (for example thru the 
assimilation of technological knowledge), 
*
i y = U(Z1), and the utility that would be 
obtained if he do not have access to those markets, 
*
i v =U(Z0), where Z are the sales 
obtained
5. Assuming that this difference between the utilities is determined by a set of 
specific characteristics of each producer,  i x , the following relationship can be raised: 
   ) (
*
i i i x f y =                  (1) 
                                                 
5 The asterisk (*) has been used to represent the fact that both utility levels are latent variables (not 
observable variables)   9
Where it is assumed, without loosing generality, that the utility when not having access to 
dynamic markets is equal to 0, and therefore the difference of utilities is equal to yi.  If 
the Zsi value, sells value, of those who can not sell in that market could be observed , this 
would be negative value (Zsi <0), and the distance to zero will indicate how far is that 
farmer from those dynamic markets. Due to the fact that the utility levels are not 
observable, it is necessary to define an observable indicator, y, which will take the value 
of 1 when the utility related to the access to dynamic markets higher to the utility of not 
having that access, and 0 in the contrary case. In this context, a probit model 
approximation of access to dynamic markets would be: 
  
  ) ( ) 1 ( β i i X y prob Φ = =                          (2) 
 
where the endogenous variable takes the value of 1, if the household has access to a 
dynamic market, and 0 otherwise. The Xi  vector contains a set of variables that 
characterize the farmer, these include: demographic variables (number of household 
members, and head of the household age), education (years of education for the head of 
the household), value of goods possessed (value of households assets for production), 
measures of risk aversion (the rate of risk aversion is calculated through a set of games), 
of access to credit (farmers perception of credit line) and social capital (number of 
organizations in which the household takes part). β  is a vector of coefficients that 
controls the relationship between the household characteristics mentioned earlier and the 
dynamic markets participation; and finally  i u  is a random error.  
 
Once the estimation of the probit model has been made, it is possible to obtain from the 
equation an estimation of the “distance to the market” (δ). This distance is defined in 
terms of the required increase in any variable that characterizes the farmers for 
example
c x , in such a way that the farmers that do not participate on the market of 
technical assistance can still have access to the market: 
 









≡− = −                                                          (3)   10
In this case  ˆ
c
i x  is the amount of credit that the household i needs to be able to participate 
on a dynamic market, 
c
i x  is the credit level observed on that household.  c β  is the 
parameter that represents the measure of the effect of the credit over the participation and 
I X β  is the product of the matrix of characteristics of the household  multiplied by the 
coefficients without the credit level. It is important to note that we have chosen credit as a 
convenient monetary yardstick, but δ can certainly be measured through any other 
indicator, like years of education, land size, etc. 
 
Since the data is only observable for the potato sales that take place on dynamic markets, 
the only farmers that are being considered are those that participate on those markets and 
not the ones that sell to traditional markets, for the latter ones the sales are calsified as 0 
(censured data). To address the censored nature of the data a Tobit model is relevant, 
because it would allow us to obtain an estimator of the latent variable for those that are 
not accessing dynamic markets. Once the estimators of the Tobit equation are obtained it 
is possible to use the decomposition of the marginal effects proposed by McDonald and 
Mofitt (1990), to assess, under an exogenous shock, the relative importance of the 
presence of new producers’ respect to the increase on the sales of the ones that were 
already selling on the dynamic markets. That decomposition is as follows: 
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From this equation, a change in  i x has two effects, the first one affects the conditional 
average of  
*
i y  on the positive part of the distribution; and the second one, affects the 
probability that the observed data falls on that part of the distribution.  
5. Empirical results 
5.1   Determinants of access to dynamic markets for the small potato farmers 
 
Table 2 shows the main determinants of farmers having access to dynamic markets for 
potato. As it can be seen, the main variables that explain participation are those   11
associated to the degree of organization of the producers, the level of education of these, 
and the access to credit (represented by the credit line indicator). 
 
Table 2 
Probit Models for Market Participation in Potato Dynamic Markets 
Variables Marginal Effects
(St. Desv.)
Model 1 Model 2
Number of Household Members -0.028 * -0.026
(0.015) (0.015)
Age of Head of Household -0.004 ** -0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Maximum Years of Education within the Household 0.021 * .
(0.011) .
Máximum Education Achieved is Incomplete Primary (0=no, 1=yes) . -0.224
. (0.060)
Risk Attitude - (1=more averse, 5=less averse) 0.023 0.025
(0.018) (0.019)
Credit Line (thousand of soles) 0.01 *** 0.011
(0.003) (0.003)
Land Holding (Has.) 0.005 0.005
(0.006) (0.006)
Number of Organization Memberships 0.114 *** 0.118
(0.024) (0.024)
NGO Dummy  (0=Ecoser, 1=Fovida) -0.122 ** -0.124
(0.060) (0.061)
Number of Observations  287 287
Pseudo R-square 0.219 0.222
Participants
% positive predctions  40.7% 34.6%
% negative predictions  59.3% 65.4%
Non participants
% positive predctions  5.8% 4.4%
% negative predictions  94.2% 95.6%
Note: Marginal Effects are calculated for dummies reflect the change when dummy changes from 0 to 1.
***99% significance, ** 95% significance, * 90% significance.  
 
Table 3, shows the results of the estimation of the necessary credit increase to turn non-
participant farmers to participate in the dynamic markets as a result of the technical 
assistance services. To express the distance to the market on monetary units, the 
necessary amount of the credit line increase has been simulated for those that do not 
access to dynamic markets.  
Table 3 
Distance to "Dynamic Markets” 
(in units of Credit) 
Credit increase per
hectare                
(thousand soles per ha.)
Metric on of            Potato 
Output                 
(thousand soles per ha.)
Muestra Total 26.9 24.4 4.9 1.39%
Muestra Ecoser 25.4 19.1 4.5 1.44%
Muestra Fovida 28.1 28.3 5.1 1.35%
Source:  Owns estimated based on GRADE 2003 Survey
Potato Producers       
by zone
Average increase on 
credit required to access 
a dynamic market       
(thousands of soles)
Credit increase as % of 
Potato value of Ouput 
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It is surprising the relative magnitude of that “distance”. In average the distance 
represents less than 2% of the production value making evident that those not entering 
dynamic markets may not be as far away as we may believe. However, as it is shown on 
Figure 1, there is a strong within variance between farmers. Some farmers are extremely 
close to the market, on the sense that just a small increase on the credit line would allow 
them to access dynamic markets. On the other hand, an important group of small farmers 
(more than half of them) are located further away from the market; at a distance of 
25,000 soles
6 (in this case the number is almost three times higher than the average sales 
from a farmer to the traditional market). Moreover, 10% of the sample is located at 
distances higher than 50,000 soles (i.e. 15,150 US$), which is the maximum credit line 
registered on the sample of farmers that had access to the dynamic markets. 
 
Figure 1 

















5.2   Impacts of the sales to dynamic markets 
 
Obviously, it is not only important to know how close can a farmer be from selling his 
first unit of production in a new market, but also know how much could he sell in that 
market if some of the restrictions that he faces would be relaxed. Table 5 shows different 
                                                 
6 This is approximately 7,500 US$.   13
simulations based on the Tobit regression results depicted in Table 4. The first simulation 
duplicates the average credit line available, but distributes it evenly among farmers (the 
same amount for each one). On the other hand, the second simulation duplicates the 
credit line of each individual farmer. Finally, the third one duplicates the credit line per 
hectare of each farmer. 
Table 4 





Number of Household Members -2.291 -5.772 1.179
(4.470) (8.252) (2.354)
Age of Household Head -1.418 ** -1.223 -0.74 **
(0.701) (1.285) (0.371)
Máximum Education Achieved is Incomplete Primary (0=no, 1=yes) -71.908 -1.897 -247.696
(56.238) (92.586) (0.000)
Risk Attitude - (1=more averse, 5=less averse) 0.067 0.413 0.306
(5.609) (10.705) (2.787)
Credit Line (thousand of soles) 2.789 *** 4.92 *** 1.043 ***
(0.598) (1.146) (0.304)
Land Holding (Has.) 4.801 *** 5.671 ** 0.518
(1.549) (2.377) (1.158)
Number of Organization Memberships 22.124 *** 28.147 ** 10.046 ***
(6.750) (13.869) (3.227)
NGO Dummy  (0=Ecoser, 1=Fovida) -53.047 *** . .
(17.807) . .
Constant -48.793 -112.56 -26.648
(46.488) (89.938) (21.243)
Number of Observations  287 128 159
Number of Censured Observations  207 89 118
Pseudo R-square 0.0689 0.0781 0.0772
Participants
% positive predictions  30.1% 41.5% 28.6%
% negative predictions  69.9% 58.5% 71.4%
Non participants
% positive predictions  2.9% 3.4% 2.6%
% negative predictions  97.1% 96.6% 97.4%
Note: Marginal Effects are calculated for dummies reflect the change when dummy changes from 0 to 1.





Decomposition of Dynamic Markets Sales Variation after Simulations of Positive Credit Shocks 
(1) (2) (3)
Decomposition
By older sellers 920                  35.7% 2,443               58.0% 4,316               62.1%
By newer sellers 1,654               64.3% 1,772               42.0% 2,637               37.9%
Total variation 2,573               100.0% 4,215               100.0% 6,953               100.0%










+ credit t credit + 2 * i credit
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Results of the first simulation suggest that the response is important, yielding a 47% 
increase of 47% on the sales to dynamic markets. Furthermore, two thirds of this increase 
is concentrated on producers that had never been related to those markets, and only a 
third of it is related to old farmers that already had access these markets. On the other 
hand, under the other two scenarios, as it was expected, we found a bigger impact on 
older farmers that already had access, had a greater amount of land and possessed other 
assets that made them more productive. In contrast, under these scenarios, farmers with 
no current access would have smaller possibilities to access dynamic markets.  
 
5.3   How robust are these results? 
One potential problem with the estimated “distance to market” is that it is difficult to 
know its statistical distribution to be sure that the average values reported above are a 
reasonable approximation to the expected value of the distance to the market. The 
problem lies in that is not possible to obtain directly the distribution of δ since it is the 
ratio of two random quantities (see equation 3). 
 
As has been already mentioned, δ measures what is needed for producer i , in terms of a 
particular observable (in this case credit), to participate and sale some quantity in the 
dynamic market. The problem is that δ is the ratio of two random quantities, which 
depend on u 
p and u 
s. One indirect way of evaluation the distribution of δ is using some 
Monte Carlo simulation method. In this case following Holloway et al (2002) we use a 
Gibbs sampler, which is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo method. The idea behind this way 
of retrieve the posterior distribution of δ is that if we know the conditional distribution of: 
 
|,, ~ [( ) ,( ) ]
PS P P y y Truncated Normal E y v y β Σ  
|, , ~ [ () , () ]
SP S S y y Truncated Normal E y v y β Σ    (5) 
)] ( ), ( [ ~ , , |
S S P S v E Normal y y β β β Σ  
| , , ~ Wishart - Normal Inverse [ ( ), ( )]
SP yy E v β ΣΣ Σ  
 
is possible to draw random samples of the posterior distribution of  ) , , , ( Σ β
S P y y F , 
which is the joint distribution of all parameters of interest (the latent variables that 
measure the distance to the market and the standard deviations of those estimates) this   15
random samples can be obtained in a consistent way following the iterative procedure 
suggested by Holloway et al (2002). This procedure allows us to obtain simultaneously 
the parameters of the probit and tobit equation plus the estimate of the “distance to the 
market and its confidence interval. 
 
Figure 3 shows the confidence interval obtained for the distance to dynamic potato 
markets
7. It is interested to note that although the average values are similar to the ones 
reported above, the distribution of the parameter of interest (δ) is asymmetric and biased 
towards zero. This pattern may be a signal that farmers in the area under study may be 
more easily prone to enter the market than initially thought as it may be need a lower 
increase in any of the independent variables to motivate a demand for technical assistance 




Esimated Distance to the Potato Dynamic Market 










Lower  Bound (5%)
Distace to the Dynamic Market
Upper Bound (95%)
 
                                                 
7 Participation and sales equations are very similar to the ones reported above and are not report here but 




Market failure in rural Peru is widespread due to many problems like poor infrastructure, 
market segmentation, poor enforcement of contracts, imperfect information, high risk, 
and regulatory uncertainty, among the most important. Under this scenario, it is 
unrealistic to expect that agro industry by itself will be successful in connecting farmers 
to output markets. Such a situation of non-competitive markets and inefficient private 
provision may justify Government and/or NGO intervention. However, these 
interventions need to be cautious to avoid amplifying these problems and further 
retarding or, even worse, impeding the development of efficient and competitive markets 
 
As mentioned, the relationship between the small farmers and the two dynamic markets 
identified in this study has been mediated, in both cases, through NGOs. In cases were 
thin or underdeveloped markets prevail, NGOs may provide the “social capital” needed 
to successfully link small producers facing high marketing and transaction costs with 
processors that face high uncertainty and monitoring costs. NGOs may provide market 
access information through its networks of contacts. They may also reduce transactions 
costs in contracting by building trust in both sides of the market spectrum. Further, NGOs 
may build capacity for collective action in small and disperse farmers. 
 
As Johnson et al (2002) argue that firms use their information networks to identify and 
contact clients, to access market information and inputs, and to obtain technical and 
financial assistance. In this case, it is clear that both NGO’s, and specially FOVIDA, are 
very successful in using its information network to help small potato farmers reach new 
dynamic market opportunities. 
 
In addition financing problems for the producers are quite serious. Credit does not reach 
the farmer in time. Considered as a serious problem in general, this fact is critical when 
farmers are growing a variety like Capiro, which requires enough liquidity from sowing 
to harvest. For example, for some farmers interviewed for this research, the loans were   17
only disbursed after the harvest. As a consequence, they were not able to test the sugar 
content of the potato (which cannot exceed 0.03%) and harvest them before reaching 
required levels. 
 
In summary, the results obtained point out the fact that appropriate investment policies in 
infrastructure need to go together with well-functioning market institutions to take 
advantage of market opportunities, sustain increased agricultural output, and raise rural 
incomes. This is a critically important for small holders. When market information and 
markets themselves are not accessible to the small holders, even when hard infrastructure 
exists, farmers capture little of the value they create. The demand and supply remain 
highly unstable, and so are the distribution costs for goods produced in rural areas. All in 
all, markets often do not work for the small holders and there is a need of interventions as 
the ones analyzed in this paper. 
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